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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-Adoption of Uniform 
Commercial Code as the Applicable Federal Law 
in an Action for Breach of Government 
Contract-United States v. 
W egematic Corp.* 
Appellant contracted to supply the Federal Reserve Board with a 
"truly revolutionary" electronic digital computing system. After 
twice requesting postponement of the delivery date, appellant in-
formed the Board that delivery under the terms of the contract would 
be impracticable because of unforeseen engineering difficulties that 
would require at least one year and one million dollars to overcome. 
Appellant asked for cancellation of the contract, but the Board re-
fused and brought a suit for damages. Both parties conceded that 
federal law governed the action; appellant, however, argued that sec-
tion 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) should be 
adopted as the controlling federal law of sales. This section excuses a 
default on a contract when the failure of presupposed conditions 
makes performance impossible.1 The federal district court rendered 
judgment for the United States. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the 
court adopted section 2-615 of the Code as the controlling federal law, 
but held, affirmed. Section 2-615 of the Code does not relieve appel-
lant from a default when appellant has promoted its product as a 
revolutionary breakthrough, expressly agreed to liquidated damages 
in case of late performance, authorized the Board to resort to other 
manufacturers in the event of non-delivery, and has not presented 
sufficient evidence of the failure of presupposed conditions. 
The court's adoption of the Code as the controlling law repre-
sents an attempt to make the law applicable to federal contracts 
compatible with current commercial practice. The number of federal 
government contracts has been steadily growing as a result of both 
the constant expansion in the scope of government activities and the 
express federal policy favoring the dispersal of government contracts 
• 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 and comment [hereinafter cited as 
U.C.C.]. 
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among small businesses.2 Thus, two questions have become increas-
ingly significant: (I) whether to construe these contracts according to 
federal or state law; (2) if federal law is to be applicable, what sources 
should the courts draw on to determine the substance of that law. 
It is clear that federal law applies where there is both a federal 
statute or regulation governing the activity at issue3 and a congres-
sional intent that this statute or regulation should be construed 
under a uniform federal rule.4 Unfortunately, Congress has not 
manifested any such intent with respect to the construction of govern-
ment contracts. Nevertheless, federal courts have generally come to 
hold that federal law is applicable in federal government contract 
cases.5 
The problem of choice of law in government contract cases is an 
outgrowth of the Erie6 decision in which the Supreme Court cast 
doubt on the power of the federal courts to declare the federal law as 
governing, even when a valid federal program is involved.7 The 
effect of Erie on federal contract cases was unclear: in the five years 
following the decision, the federal courts could not agree as to 
whether state or federal law controlled. The question was somewhat 
clarified when the Supreme Court ruled on a related issue in Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States.8 In that case the court held that the 
government's rights and duties on the commercial paper it issues are 
to be measured by federal law. The sweeping language of this opinion 
led to a resurgence in the application of federal law in cases involving 
established federal functions, including government contract cases.9 
2. E.g., 64 Stat. 815 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 215l(d) (1964). See also Pfocher, 
The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA. 
L. REV. 37 (1951). 
3. E.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (regulation); Sola Elec. Co. v. 
Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 
315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) (statutes). 
4. E.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); United States v. Lambeth, 176 F.2d (9th 
Cir. 1949). Although these two rules may appear to be similar, there have been instances 
in which the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended state law to be 
applicable despite the existence of a federal statute regulating the activity concerned. 
E.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, modified, 317 U.S. 602 (1942). 
5. See note 16 infra. 
6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Mr. Justice Brandeis declared in a 
now famous dictum: "There is no general federal common law." 
For discussions that include the topic of the law to be applied in federal government 
contracts cases, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New England Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Com-
petence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 
U. PA. L. REv. 797 [hereinafter cited as Mishkin); Reifenberg, Common Law-Federal, 
30 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1951); 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946). Contrary to Mr. Justice 
Brandeis' opinion in Erie, these authors have concluded that there is in fact a sub-
stantial body of federal common law. 
7. See Mishkin 799-801. 
8. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963); Mishkin 828-32. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Pack v. United 
States, 176 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949). See also American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone 
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Since Clearfield, the federal courts have generally applied federal 
law in government contract cases.10 This tendency to prefer federal 
over state law can probably be explained by three factors: (1) the 
substantial body of federal legislation pertaining to the negotiation 
of government contracts; (2) the fact that these contracts are fre-
quently incident to interstate transactions; (3) the high likelihood 
that the litigation would be in the federal courts, regardless of the 
law applied.11 
The statement that federal law applies in federal government 
contract cases must, however, be qualified. Uncertainty has arisen 
as a result of cases that have failed to indicate whether they have used 
federal or state law to reach a result that is possible under both.12 
Further doubt is raised by cases in which the court chose state law 
but did not decide whether it was applying state law in its own right 
or adopting it as the federal rule.13 In addition, there are certain 
types of cases, involving some federal interest, in which the federal 
courts continue to apply state law: when Congress is found to have 
intended that state law should apply;14 when federal statutes incor-
porate concepts that have always been determined by local law;15 
and when the transactions in question are essentially local in nature 
and there is no overriding federal interest dictating the use of federal 
law.16 Moreover, it has been suggested that state law might apply 
when the Government places itself in such a position that its rights 
must be ascertained by reference to local law; as when the govern-
ment purchases real estate from one whose title may be invalid under 
local law.17 Finally, when there is no need for uniformity, state law 
Tire&: Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961); Dumbauld, The Clear Field of Clear-
field, 61 DICK. L. REv. 299 (1957); Friendly, supra note 6, at 409; Mishkin 801; Pfocher, 
supra note 2, at 44; Reifenberg, supra note 7, at 165-66; 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953). 
10. E.g., Priebe &: Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); National Metropolitan 
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Dyke v. Dyke, 227 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955), 
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956); Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States, 172 F. 
Supp. 268 (Ct. Cl. 1959). See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963); Pfocher, supra 
note 2, at 37, 54-55. However, one commentator has noted the dangers inherent in a 
blanket application of federal law to all government contracts and the necessity for 
variations in special contexts. See Mishkin 820. 
11. Ibid. 
12. E.g., S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946). 
13. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); 65 MICH. L. REv. 359 (1966). 
14. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); United States 
v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962) (what constitutes real property for 
purposes of federal condemnation). 
15. E.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (meaning of "children''); Poff v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 327 U.S. 399 (1946) (meaning of "next of kin" under the FELA). 
16. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956). 
17. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947) (clictum) ("as 
when it purchases real estate from one whose title is invalid by that law in relation 
to another's claim'). But see United States v. State Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 
1963). 
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will control an action on a government contract which has been 
adapted to the specific law of the state concerned.18 
Even where the courts purport to apply a federal rule, the sources 
from which this federal rule is determined have remained varied.19 
One possible source, which was suggested in Clearfield, is the com-
mercial law that was developed by the federal court sJecisions in the 
century prior to Erie.20 The courts also have often turned to state 
law21 and to the general principles of contract law, as sources for 
determining federal law.22 The principal case is in accord with a 
separate line of decisions that have found federal law in certain uni-
form laws that have been generally accepted by the states, such as the 
Uniform Sales Act,23 the Negotiable Instruments Law,24 and the 
Warehouse Receipts Act.25 
It has been argued that a federal law of contracts should be en-
acted in order to end the disparities, confusions, and conflicts that 
arise under present law, and thus prevent the rights of the United 
18. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); cf. United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 
577 (8th Cir. 1956). Contra, United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956), 
rerld on other grounds, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957). 
19. See Mishkin 797. In a given case a federal court might formulate a substantive 
rule of its own or elect to draw from an established body of state law. Basically, this 
process of election involves a balancing of the need for a uniform federal rule against 
the desirability of absorbing local law. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS § 59 (1963); 
Mishkin 811-13 &: 814-32. ·where there have been compelling reasons to ignore state 
law and to follow an independent federal rule, courts have done so either because 
of a clear congressional policy, e.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940), or lack 
of a significant advantage to be served by adopting state law, e.g., Dyke v. Dyke, 227 
F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956). 
20. Mr. Justice Douglas noted that although the federal law merchant, which 
developed as part of the federal common law in the century following Swift v. Tyson, 
41 U.S. (16 Peters) I (1842), represented general commercial law rather than a strictly 
federal rule designed to protect federal rights, it stood as a convenient source from 
which to fashion federal rules for federal question cases. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). 
21. E.g., Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust &:: Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); 
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 u.s 570 (1956); see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963); 
Mishkin 820-28. 
22. E.g., Priebe &:: Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. 
Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Southwest Eng'r Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 
998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., 186 
F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951). 
23. E.g., United States v. Hamden Co-op. Creamery, 297 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1961); 
Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1949); United States v. 
United States Foreign Corp., 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Reeve Soundcraft Corp., 
2 CCH Gov'T CONT. REP. H 17,600.572 &: 17,605.30 (1964). 
24. New York, N.H. &:: H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 
1950). 
25. Terminal Warehouse v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 937 (D.N.J. 1952). However, 
in a subsequent Second Circuit case, Judge Friendly rejected a proposed application of 
the same act because it would not have expressly resolved the issue before the court. 
Yet state law was adopted, and since both states involved had previously enacted the 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the act was still given effect. See Cargill Inc. v. Com-
modity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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States from being subject to inconsistent26 or possibly unsympathetic 
treatment in different jurisdictions.27 This goal of uniformity is 
presently unattainable in view of the many alternative sources from 
which a federal court may choose a rule of decision.28 Indeed, it has 
even been suggested that the federal courts have regressed to the 
very state of uncertainty that Erie was intended to eliminate, by 
engaging in the process of deciding whether to formulate their own 
rules or to refer to state law.29 In the principal case, the selection of 
the Code as the federal law of sales demonstrates an awareness of this 
problem and provides an avenue for its resolution. The adoption 
of a uniform act as the federal law seems to promote certainty and 
uniformity in actions involving government contracts.30 The funda-
mental rationale underlying Judge Friendly's majority opinion was 
that if the court failed to adopt the Code, the progress that the states 
have made in the direction of a uniform commercial law would have 
been undermined.31 Thus, the principal case demonstrates the feasi-
bility of implementing a truly uniform law of government contracts 
through adoption of the Code by the federal judiciary. All federal 
government contracts would be governed by the same set of rules, 
and these rules would be compatible with those already in effect in 
most states. Moreover, private contractors would not have to ac-
custom themselves to a different set of standards when dealing with 
the federal government.32 
The infrequent recourse to uniform laws in the past, however, 
raises serious doubts as to whether the federal courts will regularly 
apply the Code,33 and seems to indicate that the only viable answer 
is a Congressional act making the Code applicable to all federal 
26. See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Byron Jackson Co. 
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940). 
27. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS Appendix A (April 1966 Draft); Mishkin 820. 
28. See United States v. K.ramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Mat-
thews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 
1957). The courts split as to whether federal or state law controlled in an action against 
a commission merchant for selling livestock subject to a chattel mortgage which secured 
a loan from the Farmers Home Administration. A potential source of conflict was 
created even though these courts found the merchant not liable, since the more wide-
spread state rule would result in liability. Thus, if the Kramel court, which chose to 
apply state law, had been in another state and applying state law, the result would 
bave been different. See 105 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1956). 
29. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 411. 
30. See New York, N.H. &: H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 
(2d Cir. 1950). After noting that the NIL had been enacted in every state and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Judge Hand asserted that it was a source of federal law "more com-
plete and more certain, than any other •••• " This passage is cited by Judge Friendly 
in the principal case at 676. 
31. Principal case at 676. 
32. See Mishkin 828, 830. 
33. See Mishkin 827; cf. Mount Vernon Co-op. Bank v. Gleason, 367 F.2d 289 (1st 
Cir. 1966), 
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transactions. The chief merit of this proposal is, of course, the 
greater uniformity in commercial law that would result. Further-
more, by adopting the Code as the law applicable to federal trans-
actions, Congress would set an example which might encourage other 
nations to enact a similar code and thereby assist in the removal of 
international conflicts in commercial law.34 By limiting its adoption 
of the Code to cases involving federal government transactions, 
Congress also would escape the difficulties that might attach if it 
adopted the Code as applicable to all transactions in interstate 
commerce.35 There would be no unconstitutional invasion of an 
area of law normally reserved to the states.36 Moreover, since most 
of this type of litigation is already in the federal courts, either 
through federal question jurisdiction or because the United States 
is a party, there would be no overburdening of federal court 
dockets.37 A more troublesome obstacle, however, results from the 
fact that the Code is inconsistent with some existing federal regula-
tions38 and statutes.39 Enactment of the Code would repeal prior 
conflicting legislation, 40 but if Congress desired to retain such regula-
tions and statutes, it could certainly harmonize them with the Code 
before its adoption. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of Congressional adoption of the 
UCC for transactions involving the federal government, the princi-
pal case indicates that the federal courts have a way to perform the 
task of achieving uniformity. 
34. See Dean, Conflict of Laws Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Case for 
Federal Enactment, 6 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1953). The author reports that Japan is con-
sidering adoption of the UCC. 
35. For arguments favoring a federal enactment of the UCC making it applicable to 
all interstate transactions, see Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 16 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PRoB. 100 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Braucher, Federal 
Enactment]; Braucher, The Progress of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 293, 300-01 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Braucher, The Progress]; Dean, supra note 34, 
at 479. 
Although unclear for interstate transactions, Congress could clearly enact the UCC 
as federal commercial law. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 102; .Braucher, The Prog-
ress 301 (1962); Dean, supra note 34, at 482; Friendly, supra note 6, at 419-20; Comment, 
45 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1947). The comment makes the interesting suggestion that the 
Code be adopted pursuant to the treaty making power of the federal government. 
36. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 102; Friendly, supra note 6, at 428. 
37. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 111-12; Friendly, supra note 6, at 428 . .Braucher 
does not believe that adoption of the Code for interstate transactions would result in a 
significant burden on the federal courts, but for persuasive discussions to the contrary, 
see FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 3, 60 &: 102-07 (1928); 
Mishkin 813. 
38. Mount Vernon Co-op. Bank v. Gleason, 367 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1966). 
39. Representative of such statutes are the National .Bank Act and the .Bankruptcy 
Act. Although some effort has been made to reconcile federal legislation with the poli-
cies embodied in the Code (as in some amendments to the Warehouse Act), such recon-
ciliation has been on a very limited scale. See Braucher, The Progress 293, 301 (1962). 
40. U.C.C. § 10-103 repeals statutes, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the Code. 
